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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
"A distinction between stocks and bonds for the essentially
practical purposes of taxation is more fanciful than real.
Certainly, for such purposes, the differences are not greater
than the differences between tangible and intangible property, or between bonds and credits. When things so dissimilar as bonds and household furniture may not be
subjected to contrary rules in respect to the number of
states which may tax them, there is a manifest incongruity
in declaring that bonds and stocks, possessing for the most
part the same or like characteristics, may be subjected to
contrary rules in that regard." 30
The court points out that "the reciprocal inheritance statutes
now in force in a preponderating number of states of the Union
make no distinction between the various classes of intangible personal property." 31
The chain of decisions fixing one situs for the taxation of intangibles, that situs being the domicile of the owner, seems now to
be almost complete. The last link will have been added when the
court considers the situs of intangibles which have been given by
the owner a business situs in a state other than that of the owner's
domicile, the lack of agreement among the members of the court making this an extremely speculative question. Even if complete prohibition of multi-state taxation be taken as already achieved, there
remains the question of how the court will determine future cases
which may present the problem of whether a single economic interest
is presented for review, and whether some single economic interests
may be treated
as supporting a series of legally recognized interests
2
therein.
THEODORE S. WECKER.

STATE TAXATION-INTERSTATE

PEDDLING.

From early times in England and America there have been statutes regulating the occupation of itinerant peddlers and requiring
(1929) c. I. Another argument is that the state, having created the corporation and protected it, it
should be allowed to tax its own creature.
DEWING, FINANCIAL POLICY OF CORPORATIONS
'o Supra note 24 at 177.
'

Ibid. at 177, citing the GEN. LAWS OF N. Y. 1930, Sec. 249-m (g) which
includes "deposits in banks, mortgages, debts, receivables, shares of stock,

bonds, notes, credits, evidences of an interest in property, evidences of debt,

and choses in action generally." (Italics ours.)
'This problem is analyzed very closely by Rottschaeffer, Power of the
States to Tax Intangibles, supra note 13 at 748 et seq.

TAX COMMENT
them to obtain licenses to practice their trade.1 Legislatures have
always felt that a license tax on peddlers would not only contribute
to a great extent to the treasuries of their respective states, but also
such a tax being in conformity with the traditions and beliefs of
their predecesiors, would hold forth few, if any, constitutional
difficulties.
It is not surprising, therefore, that the State Legislature of North
Carolina passed a statute 2 providing in substance that any person,
firm or corporation who or which shall carry on the business of selling or offering for sale fresh fruits, fish or vegetables and who or
which does not maintain a permanent place of business in the state,
shall first obtain a license and pay therefor the sum of fifty dollars
for each truck operated. Subsequent subdivisions provide that the
section shall not apply to persons selling the products of the state of
North Carolina,and make the violation of the statute a misdemeanor.
The United States Supreme Court has held that a tax imposed
in order to obtain a license to sell goods is in effect a tax on the
goods authorized to be sold, and that discrimination in favor of goods
of one state against the products of another cannot be sustained on
the principle that the tax imposed is not a tax on merchandise but
a tax on occupations.3 Even conceding that a tax is based on occupation and not on merchandise, the doctrine has further been extended 4 so that an occupation or calling cannot be taxed if the tax
imposed is so specialized as to operate as a discriminating burden
against the introduction and sale of the products of another state.
However, the courts have recognized the rule that a state may
impose a tax on those carrying on the business of peddlers even
though the goods sold may have been brought into the state in interstate commerce so long as the tax does not discriminate against the
goods of other states; 5 and a tax making such a discrimination is in
violation of clause 3 of section 8 of Article 1 of the Constitution of
1

8 and 9, WILLIAM III c. 25; STATS. 9 and 10, WILLIAM III c. 25;
29, GEORGE III c. 26; STAT. 50, GEORGE III c. 41; MASS. STAT. of
1846 c. 1846 imposed a penalty on "every hawker, peddler going from town to
town, or from place to place, or from dwelling house to dwelling house, either
on foot, or with one or more horses, or otherwise carrying for sale, or exposing
to sale any goods, wares or merchandise, *** without first obtaining a license
as provided."
2
Secs. 121 and 121Y2 of the REVENUE AcT OF NORTH CAROLINA Of 1931.
STATS.

STAT.

'Welton v. Missouri, 91 U. S. 275 (1875); Machine Company v. Gage,
100 U. S. 676 (1879); Walling v. Michigan, 116 U. S. 446, 6 Sup. Ct. 454
(1886); Brennan v. Titusville, 153 U. S. 289, 14 Sup. Ct. 829 (1894) ; Boyce v.
French, 293 Fed. 43 (C. C. 4th Wash., 1923).
'Welton v. Missouri, ibid.; Walling v. Michigan, ibid; Machine Company
v. Gage, ibid.; Webber v. Virginia, 103 U. S. 344 (1880); Darnell v. Memphis,
208 U. S. 113, 28 Sup. Ct. 247 (1908).
'Einert v. Missouri, 156 U. S. 296, 15 Sup. Ct. 367 (1895); American
Steel & Wire Co. v. Speed, 192 U. S. 500, 24 Sup. Ct. 365 (1904); Kelner v.
Stewart, 197 U. S. 60, 25 Sup. Ct. 403 (1905).
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the United6 States because it constitutes a burden upon interstate
commerce.
Wagner v. Covington 7 is a leading case on the subject. Plaintiffs were manufacturers of "soft drinks," their factory and bottling
works being located in the City of Cincinnati in the State of Ohio on
the opposite side of the Ohio River from Covington, Kentucky. They
carried on the business of selling soft drinks to retailers in Covington
by sending their drivers across the river to Covington with fully
laden trucks to call on retail dealers, who were steady customers.
The driver would go in, ascertain the amount wanted and would
deliver it. However, a small amount of the merchandise on the
truck was carried for delivery in response to particular orders received at plaintiffs' place of business in Cincinnati.
Plaintiffs contended that the license tax imposed on all vendors
of soft drinks in the City of Covington was unconstitutional as to
them in that it violated the "commerce clause" 8 of the Constitution
of the United States.
Pitney, J., writing for a divided 9 court held that plaintiffs' objection was valid only as to that portion of the deliveries made in
Covington pursuant to orders previously received in Cincinnati, but
that the balance of plaintiffs' business did not constitute interstate
commerce; and that as to those sales the tax in question was a valid
one, since it taxed alike products of Kentucky and of other states.
The latest statute 10 passed in North Carolina was soon subjected
to a court test. Plaintiff, the owner of a large peach orchard in
South Carolina and operator of over one hundred trucks peddling
peaches in the western part of North Carolina, refused to pay the
tax and commenced an action in equity to restrain the operation of
the statute as against himself and those similarly situated. Pursuant to
the Judicial Code 11 a court of three Federal Judges was convened.
Applying the principles previously enunciated by the United
States Supreme Court, the specially constituted tribunal held 12 that
a law which requires a license to be taken out by peddlers who sell
articles produced in other states and which requires no such license
with respect to those who sell in the same manner products of the
taxing state is in conflict with the power of Congress to regulate
commerce among the several states.
The decision constitutes a vehement and proper condemnation
of an attempt by a state to burden and impede interstate commerce,
Guy v. Baltimore, 100 U. S. 434 (1879) ; Bethlehem Motor Co. v. Flint,
256 U. S. 421, 41 Sup. Ct. 571 (1921).
7251 U. S. 95, 40 Sup. Ct. 93 (1919).
' ART. I SEC. 8.
'Justices Holmes and McKenna dissenting.
oSupra note 2.
28 U. S. C. A. §380.
B. M. Gramling, et al. v. A. 3. Maxwell, Commissioner of Revenue of the
State of North Carolina, 52 F. (2d) 256 (1931).
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and even the most ardent supporter of state's rights will admit that
to have decided otherwise would have been to encourage the building up of a protective tariff wall between the states. It is a situation
as presented by this case that the authors of our Constitution must
have borne in mind when they wrote Article 1, Section 8, into that
document.
PHILIP ADELMAN.

TAXABLE INCOmE-RETIREMENT OF CORPORATE BONDS AT

Dis-

COUNT.-During 1923, the respondent corporation purchased and retired for $940,779, certain of its own bonds which it had previously
issued at their par value of $1,078,300. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue declared the difference of $137,521 to be income and taxable as such. Upon a contrary ruling by the Board of Tax Appeals,
the case was brought on behalf of the government to the Supreme
Court. Held, that the repurchase of the bonds at a discount created
taxable income. United States v. Kirby Lumber Company, 283
U. S. 814, 52 Sup. Ct. 4 (1931).
Taxable income has been judicially defined as the gain resulting
from the employment of capital, labor or both combined,' provided
that the profit gained through the sale or conversion of capital assets
be included. 2 In the case of Bowers v. Kerbaugh-Empire Company,3
the Supreme Court held that, where the proceeds of a loan had been
lost by the borrower, repayment of the debt in depreciated currency
did not constitute taxable income. The Board of Tax Appeals, in
a subsequent series of cases, 4 relied upon a strained and rather illogical r interpretation of the ruling in the Bowers case to declare
'Towne v. Eisner, 245 U. S. 418, 38 Sup. Ct. 158 (1918); Peabody v.
Eisner, 247 U. S. 347, 38 Sup. Ct. 546 (1918) ; Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U. S.
189, 40 Sup. Ct. 189 (1920) ; Walsh v. Brewster, 255 U. S. 536, 41 Sup. Ct.
392 (1921).

'Goodrich v. Edwards, 255 U. S. 527, 41 Sup. Ct. 390 (1921); Burnet
v. John F. Campbell Co., 50 F. (2d) 487 (C. C. A. D. C. 1931).
'271 U. S. 170, 46 Sup. Ct 449 (1926).

'Appeal of Independent Brewing Company of Pittsburgh, 41 B. T. A.
870 (1926) ; Appeal of New Orleans, Texas and Mexico Railway Co., 6 B. T.
A. 436 (1927); National Sugar Mfg. Co. v. Comm., 7 B. T. A. 577 (1927);
Douglas County Light and Water Co. v. Comm., 14 B. T. A.-1052 (1929);
(1931).
Consolidated Gas Company of Pittsburgh v. Comm., 24 B. T. A.
'KLEIN, FDERAL INcOmE TAXATION (1929) p. 1039: "In a recent decision, it (the Board of Tax Appeals) held flatly that no taxable income or
deductible loss could be derived by a corporation from the retirement of its
own bonds. The convincing dissent of Mr. Sternhagen from the decision implies that the majority relied on the holding of the Supreme Court in Bowers
v. Kerbaugh-Empire Company. A careful reading of the Kerbaugh case furnishes no warrant for the Board's ruling which will probably be overruled
by the courts."

